Foreshadowing iPhone sales | LinkedIn.
Friday, October 26, 2012
Foreshadowing iPhone sales
Foreshadowing iPhone sales:
;)
AT&T, Verizon and Sprint have all reported the number of iPhone units shipped in Q3 2012. The history of the these sales is shown in the following graph:
Read more:
Foreshadowing iPhone sales | LinkedIn.
Foreshadowing iPhone sales | LinkedIn.
End of the Reel: Analysis of the Online Movie Streaming, DVD & Video Game Rental Industry
End of the Reel: Analysis of the Online Movie Streaming, DVD & Video Game Rental Industry: 
The idea of renting a movie is different than it was 20 years ago. Now, anyone can freely choose from a wide variety of services to watch movies and TV shows. You can even watch them on your phone, computer, any modern gaming console, and many mobile tablets.
The idea of renting a movie is different than it was 20 years ago. Now, anyone can freely choose from a wide variety of services to watch movies and TV shows. You can even watch them on your phone, computer, any modern gaming console, and many mobile tablets.
Thursday, October 25, 2012
Nokia’s Lumia brand strategy for the US
Nokia’s Lumia brand strategy for the US:
Last July I asked the question “How many Lumia phones were shipped in the US?”
My answer was 630k through the first half of this year.
I revisit this question following Nokia’s latest quarterly report.
As a quick review, Nokia reported the following performance for its mobile phones operations:
The most worrying thing of all however is that Nokia’s smartphone performance has collapsed. With only 6.3 million units shipped, the company may be the worst performer among eight competitors I track. They were below RIM’s shipment total.
The value of 6.3 represents only 7.6% of their overall phone shipments.
As the graph above shows, Nokia is going in the wrong direction with respect to moving to a smartphone portfolio.[1]
Of the total 6.3 million smartphones (aka smart devices, as per Nokia’s reporting nomenclature) 2.9 million were Lumia Windows Phone units.
Using information about average selling prices and total volumes into North America, I was able to estimate that there were about 180,000 units sold into North America during the last quarter.
Since launch, my estimate is that Lumia has sold 810k units in the North American market.
This cannot be seen as a good performance. There are mitigating factors such as the lack of upgradeability to Windows Phone 8 which probably deflated demand[2]. However, it’s a poignant observation that during the last quarter the US reached 50% smartphone penetration by users. As traction is still absent from both Nokia and Microsoft in the US market, we are back to the question of how to compete.
As the market in the US transitions from competition against non-consumption to competition among rival platforms, the Lumia brand is being forced into targeting smartphone “switchers” rather than smartphone “adopters”. The switching option is expensive, requiring aggressive advertising (see Samsung Electronics’ $11 billion ad budget).
There’s only one source of cash for that sort of strategy.
—
Notes:
Last July I asked the question “How many Lumia phones were shipped in the US?”
My answer was 630k through the first half of this year.
I revisit this question following Nokia’s latest quarterly report.
As a quick review, Nokia reported the following performance for its mobile phones operations:
The most worrying thing of all however is that Nokia’s smartphone performance has collapsed. With only 6.3 million units shipped, the company may be the worst performer among eight competitors I track. They were below RIM’s shipment total.
The value of 6.3 represents only 7.6% of their overall phone shipments.
As the graph above shows, Nokia is going in the wrong direction with respect to moving to a smartphone portfolio.[1]
Of the total 6.3 million smartphones (aka smart devices, as per Nokia’s reporting nomenclature) 2.9 million were Lumia Windows Phone units.
Using information about average selling prices and total volumes into North America, I was able to estimate that there were about 180,000 units sold into North America during the last quarter.
Since launch, my estimate is that Lumia has sold 810k units in the North American market.
This cannot be seen as a good performance. There are mitigating factors such as the lack of upgradeability to Windows Phone 8 which probably deflated demand[2]. However, it’s a poignant observation that during the last quarter the US reached 50% smartphone penetration by users. As traction is still absent from both Nokia and Microsoft in the US market, we are back to the question of how to compete.
As the market in the US transitions from competition against non-consumption to competition among rival platforms, the Lumia brand is being forced into targeting smartphone “switchers” rather than smartphone “adopters”. The switching option is expensive, requiring aggressive advertising (see Samsung Electronics’ $11 billion ad budget).
There’s only one source of cash for that sort of strategy.
—
Notes:
- The caveat is that they market some of the Series 40 phones are “smartphones” on the basis of having “smartphone-equivalent” performance. However, smartphone equivalency is and has been purely subjective. On that basis there were many times in the last decade and a half that we could have counted Java-based or BREW-based or i-Mode-based phones “smartphone-like”. Smartphone has been defined on the basis of running an operating system with native APIs for developers.
- I imagine that the upgrade path could have been known to Nokia, AT&T and Microsoft nine months ago when the Lumia was unveiled for the US by the three CEOs and therefore expectations could have been modulated accordingly.
[Infographic] The Mobile Industry in Numbers
[Infographic] The Mobile Industry in Numbers:
Presenting our latest infographic – The Mobile Industry in Numbers – the H1 2012 edition of the 100 Million Club, the watchlist of the top mobile platforms and handset manufacturers. This infographic will give you some insights into the mobile market and help put things into perspective.
Here are some of the insights from the infographic:
- Smartphone sales penetration continues to accelerate, growing from nearly 30% in Q3 2011 to nearly 40% in Q2 2012
- Nearly 2 out of every 3 smartphones shipped in H1 2012 were Android devices
- Despite low device sales, the Windows platform already has over 100K available apps in Windows Marketplace
- Although Symbian is obsolete, it still has a sizable installed base – larger than bada and Windows Phone combined
- In the handset market, Apple and Samsung account for 63% of revenues and over 98% of the profits, depriving other vendors of oxygen and therefore the ability to invest in handset differentiation and marketing
- In the smartphone market, Apple and Samsung claim more than half of total shipments. Nokia is shipping more Symbian handsets than WP handsets and their smartphone share has fallen to 7%, down from 16% in H2 2011
Presenting our latest infographic – The Mobile Industry in Numbers – the H1 2012 edition of the 100 Million Club, the watchlist of the top mobile platforms and handset manufacturers. This infographic will give you some insights into the mobile market and help put things into perspective.
Here are some of the insights from the infographic:
- Smartphone sales penetration continues to accelerate, growing from nearly 30% in Q3 2011 to nearly 40% in Q2 2012
- Nearly 2 out of every 3 smartphones shipped in H1 2012 were Android devices
- Despite low device sales, the Windows platform already has over 100K available apps in Windows Marketplace
- Although Symbian is obsolete, it still has a sizable installed base – larger than bada and Windows Phone combined
- In the handset market, Apple and Samsung account for 63% of revenues and over 98% of the profits, depriving other vendors of oxygen and therefore the ability to invest in handset differentiation and marketing
- In the smartphone market, Apple and Samsung claim more than half of total shipments. Nokia is shipping more Symbian handsets than WP handsets and their smartphone share has fallen to 7%, down from 16% in H2 2011
Nokia’s price for exclusivity
Nokia’s price for exclusivity:
Days after Nokia announced the end of life for the Symbian platform I wrote a post titled Who will buy the next 150 million Symbian smartphones? The reference was to claim by management that before there would be a complete transition to Windows Phone, 150 million legacy Symbian phones would be sold, keeping the company financially stable before the new ecosystem took root.
I reproduce the original forecast I made below with the addition of what actually happened.
[Note that the Actual stack area chart is independent of the forecast area chart as indicated by shading.]
My forecast in early 2011 was based on the 150 million Symbian phones being sold over a two year transition period. The implication with the forecast for Windows Phone was that this would still lead to a difficult contraction of volumes.
As it turns out, only 96 million Symbian devices have been sold in the 7 quarters since the platform was deprecated. It’s unlikely that there will be ever by 150 million units sold as last quarter only 3.4 million shipped. In any case, management has already retracted that claim.
What about the Windows Phone forecast? It turns out that by this point in time (Q3 2012) I had expected Lumia shipments to total 9 million. Actual shipments reached about 9.5 million, so not bad. However, the market grew faster than I had expected and overall Nokia smartphone market share turned out to be slightly lower (6.3% in Q2 vs. 10% estimated.)
The just ended quarter shares are not yet available but it’s quite possible that overall Nokia smartphones could be well below 5%, and may slip to 3% during the transition period.
My warning in February 2012 was that 150 million Symbian units would not ship since I expected there would be a stigma associated with the products among distributors, even if consumers were fine with them (which they weren’t).
The public execution of Symbian (and any other alternative being developed inside Nokia) will probably be a classic case study in disruption management. To wit: even if a platform needs to be led out to pasture, there are ways of managing decline other than suicide. Nokia’s failure is not so much having chosen the wrong alternative to Symbian, but having chosen exclusively.
However, there’s a twist. The company did not accept exclusivity of one supplier without a concession: In exchange for exclusivity, Nokia negotiated $250 million every quarter in the form of “platform support payments” from Microsoft. Nokia has to date received over $1 billion in such payments. (For the last quarter that amounts to $86 for each Lumia phone shipped.)
The tragedy comes from this $1 billion/yr not being enough. The foregone revenues from Symbian (assuming they had been able to maintain the decline to the level of 150 million units that they had originally forecast) would be about $9 billion. This means that had Nokia not knifed Symbian and had sold the shortfall units at an average price of $200 they would have received an additional $9 billion in sales. Furthermore, assuming a margin of 33% for those units, Nokia received from Microsoft one third from of what she gave up for exclusivity.
In other words, the net cost of the Microsoft exclusive relationship is at least $2 billion in operating profit.
This turns out to be the difference between being profitable and being distressed.
We will never know if this scenario would have ever happened, but the forecast management made 21 months ago suggests that at least they thought this was what they were going to get out of the bargain.
This reminds me of another article posted around the same time.
Days after Nokia announced the end of life for the Symbian platform I wrote a post titled Who will buy the next 150 million Symbian smartphones? The reference was to claim by management that before there would be a complete transition to Windows Phone, 150 million legacy Symbian phones would be sold, keeping the company financially stable before the new ecosystem took root.
I reproduce the original forecast I made below with the addition of what actually happened.
[Note that the Actual stack area chart is independent of the forecast area chart as indicated by shading.]
My forecast in early 2011 was based on the 150 million Symbian phones being sold over a two year transition period. The implication with the forecast for Windows Phone was that this would still lead to a difficult contraction of volumes.
As it turns out, only 96 million Symbian devices have been sold in the 7 quarters since the platform was deprecated. It’s unlikely that there will be ever by 150 million units sold as last quarter only 3.4 million shipped. In any case, management has already retracted that claim.
What about the Windows Phone forecast? It turns out that by this point in time (Q3 2012) I had expected Lumia shipments to total 9 million. Actual shipments reached about 9.5 million, so not bad. However, the market grew faster than I had expected and overall Nokia smartphone market share turned out to be slightly lower (6.3% in Q2 vs. 10% estimated.)
The just ended quarter shares are not yet available but it’s quite possible that overall Nokia smartphones could be well below 5%, and may slip to 3% during the transition period.
My warning in February 2012 was that 150 million Symbian units would not ship since I expected there would be a stigma associated with the products among distributors, even if consumers were fine with them (which they weren’t).
The public execution of Symbian (and any other alternative being developed inside Nokia) will probably be a classic case study in disruption management. To wit: even if a platform needs to be led out to pasture, there are ways of managing decline other than suicide. Nokia’s failure is not so much having chosen the wrong alternative to Symbian, but having chosen exclusively.
However, there’s a twist. The company did not accept exclusivity of one supplier without a concession: In exchange for exclusivity, Nokia negotiated $250 million every quarter in the form of “platform support payments” from Microsoft. Nokia has to date received over $1 billion in such payments. (For the last quarter that amounts to $86 for each Lumia phone shipped.)
The tragedy comes from this $1 billion/yr not being enough. The foregone revenues from Symbian (assuming they had been able to maintain the decline to the level of 150 million units that they had originally forecast) would be about $9 billion. This means that had Nokia not knifed Symbian and had sold the shortfall units at an average price of $200 they would have received an additional $9 billion in sales. Furthermore, assuming a margin of 33% for those units, Nokia received from Microsoft one third from of what she gave up for exclusivity.
In other words, the net cost of the Microsoft exclusive relationship is at least $2 billion in operating profit.
This turns out to be the difference between being profitable and being distressed.
We will never know if this scenario would have ever happened, but the forecast management made 21 months ago suggests that at least they thought this was what they were going to get out of the bargain.
This reminds me of another article posted around the same time.
The next 100 million iPads
The next 100 million iPads:
Having reached 100 million iPads shipped in 2.5 years the natural question is how long will it take for the next 100 million iPads?
The ramp of cumulative units shipped is shown below.
I also added the equivalent ramp for the iPhone. [The last data point for the iPad is based on an estimate of 16.5 million units in Q3 which may need revision depending on company reporting.]
The next 100 million will depend to a large degree on the success of the new iPad mini. To make an estimate we have to realize that there are several aspects of the tablet market which differ from the phone market and that therefore the predictive power for previous data is weak.
First, the channels are different. Tablets are sold as media consumption or “computing” products. They are not sold as communication devices. Therefore operators have few incentives to promote and subsidize them. They do participate in the distribution but not with the same level of commitment. That means less “push” and opportunity for discovery. Apple has an advantage in this case with their stores and brand value. The lack of operator engagement and lack of points of sale might be one reason why Android tablets have not ramped as quickly.
Second, for some competitors, the tablet itself is a loss leader and acts more as a terminal into an ecosystem rather than a product in itself. In cases where tablets are given away it’s possible that consumers might own one for each platform or ecosystem. This is similar to the game console model where the cost of the console is not a barrier to many avid gamers. This means that penetration of tablets can reach above 100% of users in some markets. Although network connections (i.e. SIM cards) can and do reach well above 100%, the number of phones in use by one person simultaneously is bounded.
Third, the lifetime of the product is as yet undetermined. Phones tend to last 2 years. This is due to evolving standards as well as high wear and tear and breakage or losses. Tablets are not as “mobile” and are less likely to be used and the basic functionality does not evolve as rapidly. It’s possible that replacement rates for tablets will follow more that of notebook computers than phones. Perhaps between 2 and 4 years. I suspect most iPads purchased are still in use today, including the first version. There will be some obsolescence from system upgrades, but the older systems will keep going.
Some of these aspects of the product could lead to slower growth and some to faster growth. That and the fact that it’s a completely new category with business and consumer and educational and vertical applications makes it a difficult product to forecast.
Having said that, the product is extremely resonant with buyers. The growth to 100 million is testament to that. The liquidity of the product, with no carrier locking and no pricing illusions means that it reaches all parts of the world quickly. So there is no obvious upper bound on the size of population who might buy it. The new price points and form factor may lead to a wave of new adoption, similar to the impact the iPod mini had on the iPod line.
There are still many factors that can slow growth, especially production capacity, but I believe that the iPad could growth between 50% and 80% which would mean 100 million more iPads could be sold by the end of 2013.
The ramp of cumulative units shipped is shown below.
I also added the equivalent ramp for the iPhone. [The last data point for the iPad is based on an estimate of 16.5 million units in Q3 which may need revision depending on company reporting.]
The next 100 million will depend to a large degree on the success of the new iPad mini. To make an estimate we have to realize that there are several aspects of the tablet market which differ from the phone market and that therefore the predictive power for previous data is weak.
First, the channels are different. Tablets are sold as media consumption or “computing” products. They are not sold as communication devices. Therefore operators have few incentives to promote and subsidize them. They do participate in the distribution but not with the same level of commitment. That means less “push” and opportunity for discovery. Apple has an advantage in this case with their stores and brand value. The lack of operator engagement and lack of points of sale might be one reason why Android tablets have not ramped as quickly.
Second, for some competitors, the tablet itself is a loss leader and acts more as a terminal into an ecosystem rather than a product in itself. In cases where tablets are given away it’s possible that consumers might own one for each platform or ecosystem. This is similar to the game console model where the cost of the console is not a barrier to many avid gamers. This means that penetration of tablets can reach above 100% of users in some markets. Although network connections (i.e. SIM cards) can and do reach well above 100%, the number of phones in use by one person simultaneously is bounded.
Third, the lifetime of the product is as yet undetermined. Phones tend to last 2 years. This is due to evolving standards as well as high wear and tear and breakage or losses. Tablets are not as “mobile” and are less likely to be used and the basic functionality does not evolve as rapidly. It’s possible that replacement rates for tablets will follow more that of notebook computers than phones. Perhaps between 2 and 4 years. I suspect most iPads purchased are still in use today, including the first version. There will be some obsolescence from system upgrades, but the older systems will keep going.
Some of these aspects of the product could lead to slower growth and some to faster growth. That and the fact that it’s a completely new category with business and consumer and educational and vertical applications makes it a difficult product to forecast.
Having said that, the product is extremely resonant with buyers. The growth to 100 million is testament to that. The liquidity of the product, with no carrier locking and no pricing illusions means that it reaches all parts of the world quickly. So there is no obvious upper bound on the size of population who might buy it. The new price points and form factor may lead to a wave of new adoption, similar to the impact the iPod mini had on the iPod line.
There are still many factors that can slow growth, especially production capacity, but I believe that the iPad could growth between 50% and 80% which would mean 100 million more iPads could be sold by the end of 2013.
The next 100 million iPads
The next 100 million iPads:
Having reached 100 million iPads shipped in 2.5 years the natural question is how long will it take for the next 100 million iPads?
The ramp of cumulative units shipped is shown below.
I also added the equivalent ramp for the iPhone. [The last data point for the iPad is based on an estimate of 16.5 million units in Q3 which may need revision depending on company reporting.]
The next 100 million will depend to a large degree on the success of the new iPad mini. To make an estimate we have to realize that there are several aspects of the tablet market which differ from the phone market and that therefore the predictive power for previous data is weak.
First, the channels are different. Tablets are sold as media consumption or “computing” products. They are not sold as communication devices. Therefore operators have few incentives to promote and subsidize them. They do participate in the distribution but not with the same level of commitment. That means less “push” and opportunity for discovery. Apple has an advantage in this case with their stores and brand value. The lack of operator engagement and lack of points of sale might be one reason why Android tablets have not ramped as quickly.
Second, for some competitors, the tablet itself is a loss leader and acts more as a terminal into an ecosystem rather than a product in itself. In cases where tablets are given away it’s possible that consumers might own one for each platform or ecosystem. This is similar to the game console model where the cost of the console is not a barrier to many avid gamers. This means that penetration of tablets can reach above 100% of users in some markets. Although network connections (i.e. SIM cards) can and do reach well above 100%, the number of phones in use by one person simultaneously is bounded.
Third, the lifetime of the product is as yet undetermined. Phones tend to last 2 years. This is due to evolving standards as well as high wear and tear and breakage or losses. Tablets are not as “mobile” and are less likely to be used and the basic functionality does not evolve as rapidly. It’s possible that replacement rates for tablets will follow more that of notebook computers than phones. Perhaps between 2 and 4 years. I suspect most iPads purchased are still in use today, including the first version. There will be some obsolescence from system upgrades, but the older systems will keep going.
Some of these aspects of the product could lead to slower growth and some to faster growth. That and the fact that it’s a completely new category with business and consumer and educational and vertical applications makes it a difficult product to forecast.
Having said that, the product is extremely resonant with buyers. The growth to 100 million is testament to that. The liquidity of the product, with no carrier locking and no pricing illusions means that it reaches all parts of the world quickly. So there is no obvious upper bound on the size of population who might buy it. The new price points and form factor may lead to a wave of new adoption, similar to the impact the iPod mini had on the iPod line.
There are still many factors that can slow growth, especially production capacity, but I believe that the iPad could growth between 50% and 80% which would mean 100 million more iPads could be sold by the end of 2013.
The ramp of cumulative units shipped is shown below.
I also added the equivalent ramp for the iPhone. [The last data point for the iPad is based on an estimate of 16.5 million units in Q3 which may need revision depending on company reporting.]
The next 100 million will depend to a large degree on the success of the new iPad mini. To make an estimate we have to realize that there are several aspects of the tablet market which differ from the phone market and that therefore the predictive power for previous data is weak.
First, the channels are different. Tablets are sold as media consumption or “computing” products. They are not sold as communication devices. Therefore operators have few incentives to promote and subsidize them. They do participate in the distribution but not with the same level of commitment. That means less “push” and opportunity for discovery. Apple has an advantage in this case with their stores and brand value. The lack of operator engagement and lack of points of sale might be one reason why Android tablets have not ramped as quickly.
Second, for some competitors, the tablet itself is a loss leader and acts more as a terminal into an ecosystem rather than a product in itself. In cases where tablets are given away it’s possible that consumers might own one for each platform or ecosystem. This is similar to the game console model where the cost of the console is not a barrier to many avid gamers. This means that penetration of tablets can reach above 100% of users in some markets. Although network connections (i.e. SIM cards) can and do reach well above 100%, the number of phones in use by one person simultaneously is bounded.
Third, the lifetime of the product is as yet undetermined. Phones tend to last 2 years. This is due to evolving standards as well as high wear and tear and breakage or losses. Tablets are not as “mobile” and are less likely to be used and the basic functionality does not evolve as rapidly. It’s possible that replacement rates for tablets will follow more that of notebook computers than phones. Perhaps between 2 and 4 years. I suspect most iPads purchased are still in use today, including the first version. There will be some obsolescence from system upgrades, but the older systems will keep going.
Some of these aspects of the product could lead to slower growth and some to faster growth. That and the fact that it’s a completely new category with business and consumer and educational and vertical applications makes it a difficult product to forecast.
Having said that, the product is extremely resonant with buyers. The growth to 100 million is testament to that. The liquidity of the product, with no carrier locking and no pricing illusions means that it reaches all parts of the world quickly. So there is no obvious upper bound on the size of population who might buy it. The new price points and form factor may lead to a wave of new adoption, similar to the impact the iPod mini had on the iPod line.
There are still many factors that can slow growth, especially production capacity, but I believe that the iPad could growth between 50% and 80% which would mean 100 million more iPads could be sold by the end of 2013.
Facebook's Third Quarter Earnings
Facebook's Third Quarter Earnings: 
This infographic contains everything you need to know about Facebook's latest earnings report.
This infographic contains everything you need to know about Facebook's latest earnings report.
Tablet Market Share Report: Nexus 7 Usage Increases 135% since July
Tablet Market Share Report: Nexus 7 Usage Increases 135% since July:
Over the past year, the tablet market has seen major changes. The third-generation iPad was announced in March 2012, and with it came the impressive Retina display, among other features. Apple has since gone on to unveil both a fourth-generation iPad and a seven-inch iPad Mini, and Microsoft even announced its own upcoming entrance into the tablet ecosystem with the Microsoft Surface. As the state of the tablet market continues to evolve, Chitika Insights conducted a research study to determine which tablet devices are seeing the most success in terms of usage from their user base.
To quantify this study, Chitika Insights looked at a sample of tens of millions of tablet impressions from the Chitika Ad network. This study was drawn from a date range of October 9th to October 15th 2012, and only includes traffic from the U.S. and Canada. Due to the iPad’s overwhelming presence in the tablet market, with usage of its tablets accounting for over 90% of all tablet Web traffic seen over our network, the usage of other tablets is relayed in terms of impressions per 100 iPads.
The Google Nexus 7 has performed extremely well, rising to fourth position among Android tablets after seeing its usage increase 135% since July. The Barnes & Noble Nook has also exceeded expectations since July, and now claims a spot as the second-most used Android tablet. Notably, the Samsung Galaxy Tablet 10.1 has retained the top position as most used Android tablet. Activity on the 7” and 10” Samsung Galaxy Tablets combined is more than double the level of usage generated by any other Android tablet.
Over the past year, the tablet market has seen major changes. The third-generation iPad was announced in March 2012, and with it came the impressive Retina display, among other features. Apple has since gone on to unveil both a fourth-generation iPad and a seven-inch iPad Mini, and Microsoft even announced its own upcoming entrance into the tablet ecosystem with the Microsoft Surface. As the state of the tablet market continues to evolve, Chitika Insights conducted a research study to determine which tablet devices are seeing the most success in terms of usage from their user base.
To quantify this study, Chitika Insights looked at a sample of tens of millions of tablet impressions from the Chitika Ad network. This study was drawn from a date range of October 9th to October 15th 2012, and only includes traffic from the U.S. and Canada. Due to the iPad’s overwhelming presence in the tablet market, with usage of its tablets accounting for over 90% of all tablet Web traffic seen over our network, the usage of other tablets is relayed in terms of impressions per 100 iPads.
As the tablet market continues to heat up, look for Android to slowly eat away at Apple’s position of dominance in the long term, but not before the iPad Mini tips momentum back to the Cupertino giant in the immediate future.
Music in the Cloud
Music in the Cloud: 
Much like the Rock n Roll Hall of Fame, the cloud music scene is full of rockstars with unique personalities. Here we break down the band and features that make each one worth a listen.
Much like the Rock n Roll Hall of Fame, the cloud music scene is full of rockstars with unique personalities. Here we break down the band and features that make each one worth a listen.
The iPad, Now in Mini
The iPad, Now in Mini: 
There's no doubt the impact the iPad has had on not only American consumers, but also the American business world. What will the iPad mini bring to the table?
There's no doubt the impact the iPad has had on not only American consumers, but also the American business world. What will the iPad mini bring to the table?
Wednesday, October 24, 2012
Friday, October 12, 2012
Why are tablets and smartphones insulated from tough economic conditions?
Why are tablets and smartphones insulated from tough economic conditions?:
The iPad launched in April (i.e. Q2) 2010. Since then the PC industry (excluding Macs) has seen a decline in growth. The following graph illustrates global shipments as reported by Gartner:
Note that the growth rate has been negative for 4 out of the eight quarters since. The latest data shows a decline in shipments of over 9% bringing yearly growth to negative territory for the first time since the recession of 11 years ago.
There’s not much I can say that hasn’t been said every quarter since 2010. The industry analysis as provided by Gartner suggests a different cause for the decline, becoming more creative each quarter. This time it’s “challenging economic environment” and “lack of appeal and innovation”, “delays due to tax incentives”, “lack of new models”, “conservatism”, “clearing out inventory” and “softness”.
The primary challenge to these ascribed causes has to be that all these factors also affect the tablet industry and yet it’s growing at phenomenal rates. The rate of new product introductions is not faster for the iPad than for PC vendors. The public and private sector buying conditions are the same. The “conservatism” on the part of institutional buyers should affect the newcomer more than the established.
The notion that an outside challenger with a new platform, an unproven set of features and missing “security” should grow in the face of difficult macro conditions that are slowing the established platform makes no sense.
My hypothesis is that the new products are solving new jobs for the users and those new solutions are trumping any “softness” in demand. In other words, an upgrade to an over-serving product will be deferred at the slightest excuse while an installation of an under-serving product that attacks an unsolved problem will be rationalized no matter the circumstances.
One product will be met with “Why should we buy it?” and the other by “Why shouldn’t we buy it?”
These are the decisions made by millions every day and yet it seems that some analysts don’t see any pattern forming. Such is the dilemma of disruption.
The iPad launched in April (i.e. Q2) 2010. Since then the PC industry (excluding Macs) has seen a decline in growth. The following graph illustrates global shipments as reported by Gartner:
Note that the growth rate has been negative for 4 out of the eight quarters since. The latest data shows a decline in shipments of over 9% bringing yearly growth to negative territory for the first time since the recession of 11 years ago.
There’s not much I can say that hasn’t been said every quarter since 2010. The industry analysis as provided by Gartner suggests a different cause for the decline, becoming more creative each quarter. This time it’s “challenging economic environment” and “lack of appeal and innovation”, “delays due to tax incentives”, “lack of new models”, “conservatism”, “clearing out inventory” and “softness”.
The primary challenge to these ascribed causes has to be that all these factors also affect the tablet industry and yet it’s growing at phenomenal rates. The rate of new product introductions is not faster for the iPad than for PC vendors. The public and private sector buying conditions are the same. The “conservatism” on the part of institutional buyers should affect the newcomer more than the established.
The notion that an outside challenger with a new platform, an unproven set of features and missing “security” should grow in the face of difficult macro conditions that are slowing the established platform makes no sense.
My hypothesis is that the new products are solving new jobs for the users and those new solutions are trumping any “softness” in demand. In other words, an upgrade to an over-serving product will be deferred at the slightest excuse while an installation of an under-serving product that attacks an unsolved problem will be rationalized no matter the circumstances.
One product will be met with “Why should we buy it?” and the other by “Why shouldn’t we buy it?”
These are the decisions made by millions every day and yet it seems that some analysts don’t see any pattern forming. Such is the dilemma of disruption.
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